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Is the past really not what it used to be?
Jack Birner
University of Maastricht
University of Trento
The history and methodology of economics used to have a somew-
hat dull image among economists. This is because economists
did not turn reflective on the subject they practised until
they were safely past the age of retirement. This has changed
since methodology and the history of economic thought have
attracted scholars who migrated from economics at a more
pristine age. Both disciplines have greatly benefited from
this rejuvenated interest. New historical results are presen-
ted, and new methodological positions are tested against them.
What has developed out of this is a renewed discussion about
the correct way of doing intellectual history.
An author who has made considerable contributions both to the
history and the methodology of economics is E. Roy Weintraub.
Weintraub is a multiple academic migrant. His first field of
specialization was mathemathics, his second economics, and his
latest the methodology and history of economics. Over the last
fifteen years he has published three books that are of inte-
rest for several reasons. They present new material from the
recent history of economics. An important part of the relevan-
ce of these results derives from the light they throw on
present-day economics. What gives a considerable added value
to  Weintraub's work is that he has shifted his methodological
position. Each book marks a further step in this development.
Weintraub uses the latest developments in the methodology of
economics in each subsequent study. As the development of
methodology in its turn reflects the state of the debate in
the philosophy of science, Weintraub's combination of methodo-
logy and history offers a unique sequence of palettes of
philosophical ideas about the correct way of writing history.
Underlying his work is the quest for a philosophy of historio-
graphy. 
In 1979 Weintraub published a book on the relation between
micro- and macro-economics, Microfoundations. The subtitle
reveals the methodological emphasis of the book: The compati-
bility of microeconomics and macroeconomics. The author's
methodological position may be characterized as Lakatosian-
Popperian:
I consider economic theory to be a scientific
discipline. .. I believe that progress occurs in
      However, Weintraub's later constructivism already1
filters through in a passage on p. 160: "Economic knowledge is
constructed piece by piece, using partial explanations which
are better fitted into the nooks and crannies of our discipli-
ne than other partial explanations. Models are metaphors,
explaining one structure in terms of another. ... Barring
logical error, the value of a model depends on the purposes of
its use by the economist whose understanding of the economy is
always in terms of those metaphors most congenial to his
mind."
      Weintraub is not alone in this, but the company he2
keeps, though distinguished, is still not very large. It
terms of sequences of models which have assumptions
that are clear and conclusions that are falsifiable
either by empirical tests or by tests of congruence
with other theoretical constructs. (Weintraub 1979:
vii)1
The historical chapters of the book deal with the development
of the neo-Walrasian programme in general-equilibrium theory,
with Keynes, and with the evolution of the neo-Walrasian
synthesis. In the spirit of Popper and Lakatos, Weintraub's
revealed intention is to contribute to the further progress of
contemporary economics by clearing the way for the integration
of micro- and macro-economics. 
1985 saw the appearance of Weintraub's General equilibrium
analysis; Studies in appraisal. If Microfoundations still
seemed to waver between Popper and Lakatos, its successor
leaves no doubt as to its methodological credentials. Its
rational reconstruction of the history of the notion of the
existence of equilibria makes explicit and extensive use of
Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programmes. This
is purely a study in methodology, and the author no longer has
the pretension to make a direct contribution to economic
theory. 
After another six-year interval, Weintraub has added a third
volume to this series, on the development of economic stabili-
ty analysis. He claims that this time he has traded in the
Lakatosian approach for social constructivism. This is reflec-
ted in the title, Stabilizing dynamics; Constructing economic
knowledge.
Weintraub's historical work has steadily improved with each
subsequent book. His latest book in particular has all the
qualities that make for good history: high information con-
tent, novelty, speculation, thrill, and a sense of relevance.
Even though the historical analysis is inspired by particular
historiographical and philosophical ideas, it stands firmly on
its own. This makes it accessible to readers from a wide
variety of backgrounds. Perhaps Weintraub's major significance
lies in the fact that he has contributed to the awareness
among contemporary economists that the economics of the 1930s
has shaped modern economics, and continues to do so to this
very day. His work has helped to put the history of economics
back on the agenda of economists.   This is no mean accomplish-2
3includes Leijonhufvud and Patinkin.
ment, and Weintraub is to be commended on it. But this still
leaves the question unanswered whether Weintraub's progression
from Popper via Lakatos to social constructivism constitutes
progress in historiography.
I will address this question by examining Weintraub's claim
that his latest book is an exemplar of social constructivism.
I shall argue that in fact Weintraub has never left behind his
Lakatosian and Popperian principles, and that his work is none
the worse for it. In order to do so, I shall first discuss the
history that Weintraub presents. Most of the critical comments
will be reserved for the second and third parts of this arti-
cle, which discuss the ideas underlying Weintraub's way of
doing history, and the philosophical ideas behind it all.
History
My dear sir, allow me to say this to you", said
Codicil at last, "To understand thought, you must
first understand thinking, and where it occurs. In
the mind and in history. To understand history, you
must first have experienced it. I will confess to
you I think you understand neither one of these
things. There is a saying: to think greatly, you
must also err greatly. I do not say Criminale erred.
But we are talking of a great mind, the Nietzsche of
our long, dark, dying century. We cannot presume
even to begin to advise such a man, a man bigger
than men, how to understand history, or interpret it
correctly. We may merely observe how he has chosen
to understand it. Do you follow me? Malcolm Bradbu-
ry, Doctor Criminale
Few economists and historians of economics will doubt the
influence of Samuelson's Foundations.  It has to a large
extent shaped their ideas of economics as a discipline. Accor-
ding to Weintraub, its influence went even deeper. It also
shaped the views of the history of economics. The habitual
history of stability theory tells the story of the gradual
discovery of the truths of the Foundations. Weintraub makes it
his explicit purpose to avoid this approach, which he charac-
terizes as Whig historiography. For reasons that I will give
later, I prefer to speak of the Faraday effect. The term is
Peter Munz', who coined it after Faraday's observation that he
would describe his own results "not as they were obtained, but
in such a manner as to give the most concise view of the
whole." (quoted in Munz 1985: 96). Munz speaks of an "honest
bias" of the historian of science as the compiler of source
material, because he 
4      Mere page references are all to Weintraub 1991.3
is honestly disinterested in the historical process
and pre-selects his material to present unhistorical
evidence. This kind of pre-selection predisposes the
historian to evaluate past science relative to the
present state of scientific knowledge rather than
relative to contemporary alternatives. (Munz 1985:
96)
This is just the sort of historiography Weintraub criticizes.
He is opposed to the idea that this is the only valid approach
to the history of economics. His alternative accounts (for he
offers several) are designed to show what the development of
the study of stability in the 1930s looks like when we take
off the "Foundational" spectacles. Chapter 2 discusses a
number of economists on whose work Samuelson drew. Weintraub
pays attention to the specific problems they addressed, or
thought they addressed. This is then compared with Samuelson's
interpretation. Weintraub argues that the interpretation of
Robbins' work as being concerned with the distinction between
statics and dynamics is only one way (Samuelson's) of inter-
preting it. Samuelson interpreted Robbins as dealing with
dynamic processes, whereas Robbins was concerned with the
largely methodological question of how to proceed from the
abstract notion of a static equilibrium to that of a dynamic
equilibrium, which has more factual content.
Frisch' interest in dynamics was part and parcel of his study
of business cycles. Because of the Faraday-effect of Samuel-
son's Foundations this background has been all but forgotten.
Weintraub is certainly correct to observe that 
the Frisch concern with untangling the systematic
from the accidental, trend from cycle, was a long
way from the issues associated with market problems
like the nature and robustness of particular price-
quantity configurations. Again, the desire on the
part of later writers to see Frisch as leading to
Samuelson, because Samuelson used the Frisch work in
his own analysis, forced the past to look more like
the present. (23)3
Tinbergen's concerns are different again. Weintraub argues
that for Tinbergen "the mathematical understanding of dynamics
is the only understanding of dynamics." (24). Tinbergen once
described the way in which economic problems are solved by
mathematical means as "the night train", thus indicating the
general lack of knowledge, or perhaps his own lack of interest
into what goes on. Tinbergen shows himself to be a naïve
rationalist (this is my term, not Weintraub's) in his view on
the relation between mathematics and economics. According to
this position, which is shared by the majority of economists
and historians and philosophers of science, there is a clearly
distinguishable, non-fuzzy boundary between economics and
5      Examples of this are given in Birner forthcoming.4
mathematics. They stand in a master-servant relationship.
Economics and mathematics cooperate in a number of neatly
separable discrete steps. First there is an economic problem.
This is then translated into mathematics. After that, the
appropriate mathematical tools are applied to solve the mathe-
matized problem. And finally, the mathematical solution is
retranslated into economics, where it solves the original,
economic problem. In reality, however, economics and mathema-
tics are often engaged in a much more complicated intercourse
on board Tinbergen's night train, one which may produce econo-
mically nonsensical offspring, or lead to a change in the
original problem.  Curiously enough, this is hardly ever4
acknowledged by economists and historians and methodologists
of economics.
Hicks, whose work is a major source of influence on Foundati-
ons, differs from Frisch and Tinbergen in that his interest in
dynamics and stability finds its origin in economics rather
than statistics or mathematics. Initially influenced by Hay-
ek's intertemporal general equilibrium theory, Hicks stressed
the role of expectations in a monetary economy. Weintraub
discusses in detail how the mathematics that Hicks used struc-
tured his ideas about stability. His choice of the mathemati-
cal apparatus of Jacobian matrices led to the paradoxical
result that whereas Hicks thought he was doing dynamics, in
fact his "formal analysis (as opposed to the verbal expositi-
on) was entirely concerned with the character of equilibrium
positions." (35; italics deleted). Weintraub traces the two
different lines along which the later literature on dynamics
developed, and which were not joined until the 1960s (and then
only partially), to two core components of the work of Hicks:
on the one hand the stability of competitive equilibrium, and
growth and capital theory on the other. The former was to
shape the bulk of the literature through the influence of
Samuelson, who reconstructed Hicks' stability analysis in a
model that was shaped by the economics of Frisch and the
mathematics of what was later recognized to be Liapunov stabi-
lity theory.
Keynes is the last of the pre-Foundational economists Wein-
traub discusses. He suggests that the enormous confusion about
the message of the General Theory hails from Samuelson's way
of translating the 1930s ideas about equilibrium, statics and
dynamics into a mathematical model. Interpreting the General
Theory in neo-Walrasian terms is just one among many possible
interpretations, and it is not the historically correct one as
it interprets Keynes via texts that had yet to be written when
Keynes constructed his theory. Weintraub mentions Leijonhuf-
vud's reconstruction in a Marshallian context with approval
because it attempts to understand Keynes in the light of
earlier texts, ones which may have influenced Keynes.
Microfoundations already contains a few (not very profound)
6      On pp. 160-1.5
observations on the role of mathematics in general equilibrium
theory.  Weintraub's following book pays more attention to5
this. It closes with a brief chapter in which the author
sketches his thoughts on the relations between economics and
mathematics. We can now see that Weintraub formulated a re-
search programme which is carried out in the third book in the
sequence. The relation between economics and mathematics is
one of the most important problems it addresses, and a wealth
of material is brought to bear on this. Chapter 3 examines the
non-economic literature that helped shape the collection of
articles that found their way, in 1947, into Foundations.
Samuelson got his ideas and techniques from a variety of
sources. Lotka's Elements of Physical Biology is one of these,
and it is largely from this book that Samuelson took over the
way to model the relation between statics and dynamics that
later became associated with his name. Although Lotka knew the
work of mathematical economists such as Cournot, Jevons,
Edgeworth and Pareto, and dealt explicitly with economics in
his book, it is one of the ironies of intellectual history
that "his influence on economics was indirect, through his
mathematical modelling, and not direct, through his analysis
of the economy of nature." (48). A point Weintraub could have
made at this point but does not is that naïve rational-recon-
structivist historians of science might see here more than an
accident. They might argue that the fact that Lotka's mathema-
tics was developed in part to deal with his economics of
nature was an objective reason why it found its way into
Foundations. (A different reconstruction of this episode of
the development of stability theory might accuse Samuelson of
deliberately suppressing references to Lotka's discussion of
economics in order to appear more original.)
Apart from the applied mathematics of Lotka, Samuelson also
used the work of pure mathematicians, notably Birkhoff and
Picard. Picard makes use of Liapunov stability theory. This
was to play an important role in the economic literature on
stability of the 1950s. Samuelson uses the method of Liapunov,
but he does not refer to Liapunov's work, although he does
refer to Picard's book, in which Liapunov is discussed. This
causes Weintraub to raise the following sequence of questions.
If Samuelson did not read the relevant pages of the
work of Picard, why did he not? If Samuelson read
the relevant pages in the work of Picard, why did he
not cite them in the same manner in which he cited
the other passages from Picard. And if he did read
the relevant pages of Picard's book, why did he not
read Liapunov, for Picard's footnote gave a clear
reference in French to the major work of Liapunov?
(55)
One possible answer to the why-not-Liapunov question, viz.
that Samuelson did not read French well, is confirmed by
7Samuelson's close colleague Robert Solow. An answer that
Weintraub finds deeper and more interesting is that Samuel-
son's interest in stability was only derivative, as he may
have considered it to be a tool to be used in comparative
static analysis. Weintraub finds this a plausible answer, but
in its turn it raises the question where Samuelson's concern
with comparative statics and his relative neglect of stability
theory came from. Weintraub indicates that part of the answer
to that question is to be found in the influence that the work
of the mathematical physicist and statistician E.B. Wilson had
on Samuelson. That Samuelson neglected the analysis of stabi-
lity and instead paid more attention to comparative statics
was an accidental and unintended consequence of the mathemati-
cal form in which he chose to present economic theory, a form
that was suggested to him by Wilson. Wilson was a student of
the physicist Gibbs, who stood in a theoretical tradition in
thermodynamics that considered equilibrium conditions more
important than stability analysis.
This is a thrilling detective story. Weintraub shows that
Samuelson had the opportunity to do stability analysis, and
that the means were readily available to him. So why didn't he
use them? Literary criminology suggests that we look more
closely into his motive. Weintraub chooses not to simply
accept Samuelson's interest in comparative statics as suffi-
cient, and starts looking for ulterior motives. I wonder
whether this is required. Let us look at what Samuelson states
are the "fundamental purposes" of his Foundations. This can be
found on pages 3-6 of the 1983 edition. The first purpose is
to unify the various sub-disciplines of economics into one
formal framework. The second main objective is to identify the
meaningful theorems in these various fields. Meaningful theo-
rems (the meaning of which I will not go into) are derived
from two types of general hypotheses. For the analysis of
individual economic units it is the hypothesis that equilibri-
um conditions are equivalent to the conditions for the maximi-
zation or minimization of some variable. For an economic
system as a whole it is the hypothesis that the system is in
stable equilibrium or motion. So far, this would seem to point
clearly to the centrality of the notion of stability, and
Weintraub's sense of wonder at Samuelson's relative neglect of
it in the technical part of his analysis is entirely under-
standable. But then Samuelson goes on to remark: "The plausi-
bility of such a stability hypothesis is suggested by the
consideration that positions of unstable equilibrium, even if
they exist, are transient, non-persistent states, and hence on
the crudest probability calculation would be observed less
frequently than stable states. How many times has the reader
observed an egg standing upon its end?" (Samuelson 1983, p.
5). It seems that this, together with the correspondence
principle that Samuelson proudly presents as a way of dealing
with dynamics through comparative statics, constitutes the
motive, and answers the question satisfactorily. Samuelson has
made the conscious choice of not going into the details of
formal stability analysis. After all, one cannot examine
everything at the same time. The appeal to plausibility is not
8at all unusual for economists, even though from a methodologi-
cal point of view Samuelson's pre-Columbian argument (or
rhetoric) deserves critical attention. I fully understand the
thrill Weintraub must have felt when raising his series of
conditional why-not questions. They are what makes historical
research so fascinating. But I wonder if in this particular
case he has not let himself be carried away, well, if not by
Whiggism, then at least by the lure of the treasure of possi-
bilities which hindsight, "that most useful of the instruments
of the historian" (Finley 1977: 104-5) allows us to discover.
I present my interpretation reluctantly because I like Wein-
traub's better. My alternative assumes a conscious decision on
the part of Samuelson not to problematize stability. I agree
that the answers to Weintraub's questions are of interest
because they might clarify "the interrelationships between the
mathematical literature and the applied literature" (55) - IF
(big if), that is, the suppositions underlying the questions
are true. In that case (and in that case only) Weintraub's
story would indeed make a strong case for the non-neutrality
of mathematics. I will return to matters of truth and false-
hood in historical analysis in the last part of this article.
However, the hypothesis that mathematics is not the sort of
tool or machine that one can switch off and on at will to let
it do exactly what one wants finds support in other case
studies in the book. These are to be found, inter alia, in
chapter 4. It zooms in on Liapunov theory, which shaped theo-
rizing about economic stability from the 1950s. The chapter
throws further light on the relationship between economics and
mathematics by discussing the importance of the timing of
developments in these fields, and the related matter of prio-
rity claims. The claims that have been advanced for Maurice
Allais being the first, in 1943, to use Liapunov analysis, are
effectively refuted. Here Weintraub shows himself a meticulous
historian who is constantly aware of the dangers of seeing the
past through the spectacles of later developments. Weintraub's
care in treating the history of economics shows itself, too,
in his account of the ways in which Liapunov theory was disse-
minated, from applications for war purposes through academic
mathematics to applied mathematics and engineering and finally
to mathematical economics. The conclusion Weintraub draws is
very different from the naïve rationalist position. Tools and
problems stand in a sort of dialectical relationship: "the
economic conceptualizations selected the tools, and the mathe-
matical tools selected the economic conceptualization." (96).
Chapter 5 shows how ideas about equilibrium evolved between
1939 and 1954. Throughout the 1930s Hayek had been struggling
to construct a dynamic theory of the business cycle on the
foundations of the static general equilibrium theory of Walras
and Pareto. Hicks was well acquaintanted with Hayek's work.
Earlier in the 1930s he had tried to get a formal grasp of
Hayek's notion of equilibrium but failed. In Value and Capital
of 1939 he undertook a renewed attempt to come to terms with
equilibrium. Hicks now distinguished two incompatible con-
cepts, one which sees equilibrium as the outcome of a market
9process, the other as a set of conditions characterizing a
rest point, and he tried to bridge the gap between the two.
Samuelson did not believe there was an incompatibility. To his
mind, the mathematical apparatus which he derived from the
work of Lotka and Birkhoff and used to model equilibrium
unified both concepts. For Hicks equilibrium was an idealiza-
tion that was central to a theory that was to depict reality
by means of a sequence of approximations to this idealized
concept. For Samuelson equilibrium had no such function. He
identified equilibrium with the solution to a set of equati-
ons. In the hands of Arrow and Debreu this was transformed
into the notion of equilibrium as a balance between supply and
demand. What Weintraub wants to make clear with this case
study is that the idea (which he calls positivist) that equi-
librium is a real state of the world and that economics tries
to find ever better ways of describing this, is wrong. What
really happens, according to Weintraub, is that the meaning of
the word "equilibrium" changes as the context in which it is
used changes. An important part in this process of meaning
change is played by the different metaphors which are associa-
ted with the different pieces of mathematics that are used. I
will come back to this later.
Historiography
- C'est votre histoire... répétait Jef d'un ton
ironique.
- C'est l'histoire que je choisirais si j'étais à
votre place... Parce que, dans ce cas, la mort de
Willems deviendrait presqu'un accident...
- Ça est un accident... Simenon, Maigret et le clo-
chard
It is Weintraub's explicit purpose to present an alternative
to what he calls Whig historiography, which sees progress in
the development of ideas, i.e. a movement "from darkness to
light, from prose to model" (p. 10). In contrast to this,
Weintraub wants to "show that there are many other ways to
read these papers and that it is not foolish to read the
record as being discursively rich, confused, and hardly ever
convergent on any coherent perspective." (p. 10) In this he
has succeeded convincingly. Weintraub  emphasizes that no
particular state in the history of economics that a particular
reconstruction shows texts to lead to is privileged. "Meaning
does not reside in texts, no[r] is it to be found. Meaning is
provided by readers who come to a text with histories of their
own, both personal and social." (37). Thus, as Weintraub
demonstrates, review articles are especially important in
shaping our present view of a discipline. It has been observed
(notably by Hayek - cp. for instance Hayek 1974) that econo-
mists sorely lack a sense of self-relativization. Considering
the fact that after nuclear physicists economists are the most
dangerous species of scientists in that their advice may (and
has) cost millions of lives, chapter 7 alone ought to be
compulsory reading for all students of economics. It discusses
10
Negishi's 1962 Econometrica review article, and shows that the
way in which Negishi presented the material is in large part
responsible for shaping ideas both of the history and of the
further course of research of stability. Among other things,
the article led to a forgetting Clower's work on stability. 
Weintraub's other case studies demonstrate how different
theoretical backgrounds led to different theories. Whether
this is best analyzed in terms of the meanings of words is an
issue that I wil return to in the last section, on philosophy.
You see that I am already incurring new debts of explication
to the reader even before the old ones that I have already
accumulated have been redeemed. It is high time to start doing
something about that.
L'histoire: plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose
At the beginning of the previous section I made a distinction
between the Faraday effect and the idea that it is the task of
the history of science to show progress culminating in the
present state of a subject. This is of more than terminologi-
cal importance. Weintraub criticizes the Lakatosian method of
rationally reconstructing the history of science as being
Whiggish. If we look at Weintraub's objections to rational
reconstructionism, we find two different arguments. One is
that it imposes the preconceived notion that science makes
progress towards the truth, which he says is connected with "a
belief that Nature or Reality itself constrains the texts in
such a manner that the texts can be read or reread as a se-
quence of moves in which Science gets closer and closer to the
Truth about Nature or Reality." (117). This is what Weintraub
calls Whiggism. What is usually meant by Whig history is the
selection of a history so as to defend a particular preferred
position, one's own, as the best. And indeed, this position is
inextricably bound up with the idea of progress. However, it
is confusing to call every history that shows or postulates
progress Whiggish. This is particularly the case with rational
reconstructions. Even though rational reconstructionists
sometimes or often (or always as is the case with Lakatos) say
they are interested, on the meta-level, in progress, the
method can perfectly do without assuming or postulating pro-
gress. There exist many rational reconstructions of other
positions than the one that is (perhaps) favoured by the
author who happens to carry out the reconstruction.
Doing history of science is very much like doing social scien-
ce. It involves behavioural hypotheses, such as the one that
scientists are motivated by progress as it is defined by
Lakatos, or that their motive is to reach consensus, as Wein-
traub supposes (for instance on p. 145). The content of the
motivational hypothesis may vary from one historiographical
approach to another. However, the structure of the historical
reconstruction remains the same:
All in all, the sum total of general laws available
to the historian of science for his reconstruction
11
      Lakatos 1971: 1146
of what actually happened is his estimate of human
nature as it performs under certain cultural and
economic constraints, plus the philosophy of science
he holds to be correct; it cannot be the sources by
themselves.... The historian of science...must have
a view of his own which he cannot really derive from
the sources themselves... This view must cover such
matters as what scientists will do, how they will
investigate, what puzzles them, how they regard
their peers, whom they will take to be their peers,
whose authority they will respect, how they will
evaluate their inspirations, how they will treat
their psychological hang-ups, what is likely to lead
to an inspiration, and suchlike. (Munz 1985: 97-8)
The assumption of progress on the meta-level has to be distin-
guished from ascribing to actors, on the object level, the
wish to make progress. In a Whig context "progress" is a
value-laden word. But in the context of a rational reconstruc-
tion it is best considered to be a technical term, or a defi-
nition, on a par with "Pareto-improvement" in welfare econo-
mics. If a rational reconstruction separates the meta-level
assumption of progress from the one on the object level, the
difference with what Popper calls situational analysis (or the
method of the logic of the situation) disappears. It is the
approach Munz so clearly describes in the passage just quoted.
The assumption of rationality it involves is the same as, for
instance, the economist's, and the history that it produces is
a rational reconstruction to the extent that the subjects
really behave rationally in the economist's sense. However,
histories of science are not even bound to assumptions of
rationality. They usually take them as their starting point,
but Iif a rational explanation is not satisfactory, the histo-
rian may look for irrational factors, as even Lakatos admits.6
Weintraub's second criticism of rational reconstructions is
that they are "ex post rationalizations [which], though they
stabilize the previous history, do not themselves present
their knowledge contemporaneously with the historical action
and actors." (10-11). In other words, they suffer from the
Faraday effect. However, this is demonstrably not the case
with many existing rational reconstructions. So, although
Weintraub is critical of rational reconstructions, one may
wonder if there is much substance to his criticism. Weintraub
is critical of Lakatosian rational reconstructions to the
point of constructing one himself, in chapter 6, in order to
compare it with the approach he now favours. But when I see
how he goes about actually doing history, I have strong doubts
as to whether this is so very different from the method of
rational reconstruction. Take the discussion of the role of
Lotka. Weintraub makes assumptions about "what Samuelson could
have known" (48; emphasis added). He states that "it is reaso-
nable to assume that Samuelson came to Lotka through Wilson"
12
(58; emphasis added). It seems to me that Weintraub, if he is
doing social-reconstructionist historiography at all, is doing
virtual social construction. He constructs a fascinating
narrative which uses inspired conjectures, assumptions about
what is reasonable in a particular historical situation,
biographical material, letters, and, of course, the written
texts. All of these sources are used in rational reconstructi-
ons, too. Apart from the terminology and the decision about
what should go into the text and what should be relegated to
the footnotes, I do not see much difference between Wein-
traub's social constructions and rational reconstructions.
Ascribing to economists the wish to reach consensus, as Wein-
raub does, is one possible hypothesis about the behaviour of
scientists. If one analyzes the development in science from
this perspective, the behaviour of individual scientists will
be reconstructed rationally in the light of this hypothesis
(even if the word "rational" is avoided). As I observed above,
the content of the motivational hypothesis is different from
the one advanced by Lakatos and his followers, but the struc-
ture of the historical reconstruction is the same. The motiva-
tional hypotheses, moreover, lend themselves to empirical
tests.
Why is it that the case studies Weintraub presents look so
much like rational reconstructions? Because it is notoriously
difficult to be a consistently non-Whig non-Faraday historian
of science! Back in 1952, when there was still reason to
consider the history of science to be "Clio's stepchild",
Dijksterhuis discussed such a "pure" position under the name
of "the phenomenological method".
It consists in that one attempts to re-enact as well
as possible the mental atmosphere of the period to
be studied, to impose upon oneself the constraint of
appealing only to the facts that were known at the
time, to speak about them in the terminology of the
period and to employ in one's calculations the me-
thods of calculation then known. In so doing, one
consciously suspends the value judgement that would
have to be passed if it were our goal to test the
ideas under examination against modern scientific
insights. In particular, one is careful not to ap-
proach those ideas with the attitude of superiority,
so disastrous for the study of history, that makes
one speak benevolently of naïvité and helplessness
and derogatorily of stupidity. (Dijksterhuis 1952:
260)
It is so difficult to follow this approach consistently that
one may wonder if it can be done at all.
Dijksterhuis contrasts the phenomenological method with what
he calls "evolutionism" (which is the Faraday approach), and
he signals the same dangers that Weintraub sees as inherent in
Whiggism:
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      Though Weintraub does not put it in such bold words, the7
intention underlying his choice for the speculative-but-inte-
resting answer over the true-but-dull one to the question why
Samuelson did not refer to Liapunov is not so very different
from Lakatos' preference for rational reconstructions over
actual history. Cp. Lakatos 1971, p. 120: "One way to indicate
discrepancies between history and its rational reconstruction
is to relate the internal history in the text, and indicate in
[I]t is particularly in this subject [the study of
the evolution of the so-called Paduan method] that
the methodical dangers that always threaten evoluti-
onism in the history of science become readily appa-
rent. Instead of posing the perfectly legitimate
question whether there has been a continuous deve-
lopment, one postulates its presence. In the case of
Oresme in particular the search to discover so-cal-
led precursors everywhere - a methodical weakness
that is endemic in historians of science - has ador-
ned this figure with modern features to the point of
deforming his true stature in the light of later
insights. Thus, the evolutionist lust for continuity
time and again appears to need the rein of phenome-
nological reflection. (ibid.: 262)
Evolutionism and phenomenology cannot do without one another.
There is no getting-away from it, not even for a self-declared
anti-Whig historian such as Weintraub. And indeed, Weintraub
does not advocate a purely phenomenological approach. He would
probably even admit that all the dangers of the Faraday effect
(or evolutionism), as Dijksterhuis puts it, "should not make
us forget that in the final analysis the history of science is
born from that lust [for continuity] and that it provides the
impulse for historical research, even more so than the lust to
indulge in the past." (Dijksterhuis, ibid.: 162)
Asking why-not questions as Weintraub does presupposes evolu-
tionism, and perhaps even Whiggism. Why didn't Samuelson refer
to and use a solution that was available in the work of Pi-
card? It "could have saved Samuelson and other economists from
twenty years of fumbling around not knowing how to prove
stability theorems about economic equilibria." (54). Why
wasn't Samuelson more concerned with stability (61-2)? Why
didn't the "development of [stability] theory follow the logic
of the mathematical theory in which it eventually was to be
embedded" (123)? In passages such as these I find Weintraub at
his very best, but it is there that he is furthest removed
from his self-professed anti-Whig constructivism. Historical
"why-didn't"-questions are counterfactuals. Asking them invol-
ves deliberately taking a different point of view, the histo-
rian's own or somebody else's, but never the one held at the
time by the author whose work the historian now studies or
reconstructs. It is inevitable that such questions presuppose
an outsider's, non-contemporary perspective, and perhaps even
a certain measure of Whiggism.7
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the footnotes how actual history 'misbehaved' in the light of
its rational reconstruction." I suspect that such choices are
part of the temperament of historians who do interesting
history.
      The proceedings were published in De Marchi 1988.8
      I was asked to comment on Weintraub's Lakatosian recon-9
struction of an episode in the development of general equili-
brium theory.
As Weintraub observes, completely satisfactory answers to
these questions cannot be found (57). The answers depend on
the decision what to keep in and what to leave out. Given his
stated preference for rhetoricism, Weintraub's initial choice
when discussing why Samuelson did not pay more attention to
stability analysis is surprisingly pre-post-modern: the wri-
tings that Samuelson cites provide the answers. But then he
adds that the context is always richer. He chooses to develop
only one possible line of inquiry, one which enriches the
analysis with "the requirement of coherence". In this passage
he seems to refer to coherence as a meta-requirement: it is
"one of the ways we appraise more general narratives", (p.
57). This still does not sound particularly post-modern, but
that changes later, when coherence is mentioned again: "The
larger community, to be a community, requires its members to
talk coherently about the economy." (146). Coherence is part
of the way in which speech communities are defined. The defi-
nition of communities raises a problem that I will adress
later.
Philosophy
- Moi, je vous laisse dire, n'est-ce pas? Ils racon-
tent ce qu'il leur plaît. Vous racontez ce qu'il
vous plaît...
Simenon, Maigret et le  clochard
In his criticism of historical positivism and his defence of a
constructivist historiography Weintraub does not stand alone.
He is in the company of E.J. Dijksterhuis, and of Karl Popper,
neither of whom is mentioned by Weintraub. In the case of
Dijksterhuis this may be a mere matter of oversight or lack of
space. With Popper it is different. Weintraub tells us that he
started to rethink the status of rational reconstructions when
he was confronted with rhetoricism, a variant of social con-
structivism, at the Klant conference in Amsterdam in 1985.  I8
was there, too,  and I was struck by the violence of the9
Popper-bashing that went on. After having been influenced by
Popper, many not only turn away from him, but find it necessa-
ry to either vilify and trivialize Popper's work, or, as is
the case with Weintraub, deliberately omit references to it
where it would have been reasonable to give them. Why is this?
This is an interesting question for an intellectual historian
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(particularly of the social-constructivist kind). Perhaps the
reason why Popper's insights are now so often brushed aside as
trivial is that they have become common knowledge. The fact
that their acceptance is the result of many a fierce intellec-
tual battle in the past is conveniently forgotten. Or maybe it
is through some Oedipal mechanism that intellectuals who owe
much to Popper now bury him in vengeful silence.
Weintraub's silence on Popper is all the more striking as
there are so many crucial issues on which they agree. This is
the case with their general attitudes towards history: 
[I]nterpretations may be incompatible; but as long
as we consider them merely as cristallizations of
points of view, then they are not. For example, the
interpretation that man steadily progresses ... is
incompatible with the interpretation that he steadi-
ly slips back or retrogresses. But the 'point of
view' of one who looks on human history as a history
of progress is not necessarily incompatible with
that of one who looks on it as a history of retro-
gression; that is to say, we could write a history
of human progress towards human freedom ... and
another history of human retrogression and oppressi-
on ...; and these two histories need not be in con-
flict; rather, they may be complementary to each
other, as would be two views of the same landscape
seen from two different points. This consideration
is of considerable importance. For since each gene-
ration has its own troubles and problems, and there-
fore its own interests and its own point of view, it
follows that each generation has a right to look
upon and re-interpret history in its own way, which
is complementary to that of previous generations.
After all, we study history because we are intere-
sted in it, and perhaps because we wish to learn
something about our own problems...
To sum up, there can be no history of 'the past as it
actually did happen'; there can only be historical inter-
pretations, and none of them final; and every generation
has a right to frame its own. But not only has it a right
to frame its own interpretations, it also has a kind of
obligation to do so; for there is indeed a pressing need
to be answered. We want to know how our troubles are
related to the past, and we want to see the line along
which we may progress towards the solution of what we
feel, and what we choose, to be our main tasks.(Popper
1973, Vol II: 267)
On specific issues Weintraub and Popper have very similar
views, too. Popper is as much of an anti-Whig as Weintraub:
[O]ur intellectual as well as our ethical education
is corrupt. It is perverted by the admiration of
brilliance ... It is perverted by the romantic idea
of the splendour of the stage of History on which we
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are the actors. We are educated to act with an eye
to the gallery. (Popper 1973, Vol II: 275)
Weintraub emphasizes the inevitability of interpretation.
Popper concurs: "History has no meaning" (Popper 1973, Vol.
II: 269). He elaborates: "in history no less than in science,
we cannot avoid a point of view; and the belief that we can
must lead to self-deception and to lack of critical care."
(Popper 1973, Vol. II: 261) I do not think Weintraub disagrees
with this. I also think that Weintraub agrees with Popper that
this does not mean that all interpretations are of
equal merit. First, there are always interpretations
which are not really in keeping with the accepted
records; secondly, there are some which need a num-
ber of more or less plausible auxiliary hypotheses
if they are to escape falsification by the records;
next, there are some that are unable to connect a
number of facts which another interpretation can
connect, and in so far 'explain'. (Popper 1973, Vol.
II: 261)
For even though Weintraub says that "[w]e can, of course,
reconstruct the past as we wish ..." (94), he cannot mean that
reconstruction is a gratuitous affair. After all, he demon-
strates that the claim that Allais was the first to apply
Liapunov theory is not in accordance with the records. He uses
plausible auxiliary hypotheses (about the mathematical dyna-
mics Samuelson could have known, p. 48, and that it is reaso-
nable to assume that he came to Lotka through Wilson, p. 58)
to make his story convincing. And he demonstrates that his
interpretation can connect a number of otherwise unconnected
facts by abandoning the thesis that mathematics is neutral.
However, if we look at a formulation of Popper's that expres-
ses the same thought in different words, I think we have come
a long way in identifying what separates Weintraub from Pop-
per. The inevitability of interpretations, says Popper, "does
not mean, of course, that we are permitted to falsify anyt-
hing, or to take matters of truth lightly. Any particular
historical description of facts will be simply true or false,
however difficult it may be to decide upon its truth or falsi-
ty." (Popper 1973, Vol. II: 261). For Popper the truth or
falsehood of a historical account matters, and truth is defi-
ned in terms of correspondence with reality. Recognition of
the fact that in history it is unusually difficult to separate
false from true statements is no reason to give up the idea
that historical reconstructions can be true or false. Wein-
traub on the other hand wants to leave truth and falsehood
behind. Knowledge is a matter of social construction, inter-
pretation, and meaning, and if he has a theory of truth at
all, it is likely to be a coherence theory.
There is a core of truth in all this. Ideas shape our views of
the world. If this is not a tautology, it is at the very least
an obvious truth. However, in construct-speak this sensible
17
      The following draws on an argument of Alan Musgrave10
that to my knowledge has not been published. I thank Rob de
idea becomes perverted into phrases of unnecessary obscurity
such as: 
by the end of the 1940s or the early 1950s, the
economy itself had changed in the only meaningful
sense [sic] in which that claim can be sustained.
That is, discursive practice about the economy had
been altered to allow simultaneous maintenance of
the two claims that the economy was in equilibrium
and that there were socially unacceptable levels of
unemployment ... (125: emphasis added). 
Mathematical tools and economic problems shape one another,
Weintraub gives many convincing examples of this. But it is
something completely different to say that "The new mathemati-
cal tool ... changed the economy itself as the economy had
come to be differently problematized." (95-6) For this to be
the case, the ordinary citizen would have to notice a change
in the world once economists start analyzing it by different
means, and I fail to see how this is possible. What people
notice in matters economic are things like unemployment,
interest rates and wage-freezes, not discursive practice.
(They may, of course, feel the consequences of the discursive
practice of economists, when it is acted upon by politicians.)
If Weintraub had said that the problems or the theories or the
models had changed under the influence of the mathematical
tools that were used, this would both have been understandable
and true. The apparent reason why Weintraub makes the above
false claim is his anti-realism. He wants to avoid talking
about "the economy" as a thing that exists independently of
our cognitive activity even if it means sacrificing truth.
This reminds me of the devious habits of old-fashioned langua-
ge philosophers, who found (and if they are not all extinct
still find) reality such a suspect notion that one had to
purify one's language from any words referring to it. Talking
about reality was simply not done. The only respectable thing
to talk about was language. That language is, among other
things, referential was conveniently forgotten because it
raised too many problems. I know a philosopher who in his
analytical days invariably showed overt signs of physical
discomfort (sweating, fidgeting, nervous laughter) when forced
to use such words as "real", "reality", and even "philosophy".
(He is now a "real" philosopher, and in much better health.)
Weintraub often suggests that the fact that knowledge is the
product of social construction implies that knowledge is
nothing but social construction. I have two objections to
this, one logical, the other empirical. The logical objection
will be briefly dealt with. The step from: "there is no unique
true reconstruction of the past" to: "truth does not matter in
historiography" is a non-sequitur. In general, there is a pair
of non-sequiturs that underlies social constructivism.  From10
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Vries for conveying the argument to me.
      This seems to me a fair translation of the passage on11
p. 125, already quoted by me, and p. 127, where Weintraub
says: "To say that economists negotiate the meaning of the
economy is not to claim that the economy does not exist: It is
not comprehensible to me what such a claim could even mean; we
have no language to discuss such silliness." (emphasis added).
      Pace Mirowski 1989.12
      Cp. Birner 1993.13
the tautologous premise "You cannot talk about a talk-indepen-
dent economy without talking about it"  the conclusion is11
drawn: "Therefore, you cannot talk about a talk-independent
economy." But this is invalid, as is any argument that derives
a contingent statement from a tautology. Social constructi-
vists compound this logical error by arguing from the invalid-
ly derived conclusion that you cannot talk about a talk-inde-
pendent economy to the statement: "a talk-independent economy
does not exist", which is another non-sequitur.
We do not have to look very far for empirical arguments again-
st the core of social constructivism. Weintraub's own book
abounds with them. It contains a great number of examples of
how particular mathematical theories imposed contraints on the
process of theory construction, even though this was no one's
intention. This demonstrates that in the science of economics,
as in ordinary life, there are unintended consequences of
human actions and decisions. This effectively refutes the
thesis that knowledge is purely a matter of construction.
Unintended consequences of mathematical theorems, being unin-
tended, have to be discovered. Therefore Weintraub's objective
that "[w]e must seek to leave "discovery" in the history of
economics in favor of interpretation, or hermeneutics" (118)
is unattainable. His social constructivism is not guilty of
the charge of being constructivist in the sense that Hayek
gives to that word.
The same type of objection may be raised against the statement
(on p. 127) that "the papers in that sequence [of mathematized
argumentation about the stability of equilibrium] could well
be understood as an attempt to show that that process was a
social process of negotiation and argument." However, the
autonomous influence of mathematics is more than a matter of
the social negotiation of meaning. Each mathematical tool
carries with it its own set of constraints. If it did not, it
would be powerless. Meaning is a central concept in social
constructivism, and it also plays a role in Weintraub's de-
scription of the influence of mathematics on economics in
terms of metaphors.  I have argued elsewhere that this is12
based on a justificationist theory of mathematics which is
untenable.  I will just point out another argument against the13
possibility that meanings become stabilized. It is that every
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set of statements has infinitely many consequences, and there-
fore unintended consequences, too. We literally do not know
what we talk about, as Popper puts it.
Though I agree with most of Weintraub's historical account of
the notion of equilibrium of chapter 5, I have several objec-
tions to make to his conclusions. First of all, the philosophy
of science which Weintraub calls positivist would better be
characterized as naïve realism. This is the idea that theories
are direct descriptions of reality. What is naïve about this
view is that in reality theories make use of idealizations,
and that the way in which these are connected with reality is
a problem that is only very partially understood. Of course,
for a non-realist like Weintraub the problem does not arise
because he does not consider theories to be descriptive at
all. But how are the advantages of such a denial to be weighed
against the disadvantages? I agree with social constructivists
that "[r]epresentation [in theories, models, etc.] is a crea-
tive, purposeful human act" (151). However, their explanation
of the effectiveness of scientific activity seems to me to
suffer from hubris if "act" in the following quotation is read
as "act succesfully": "communities that can agree on represen-
tations and descriptions can jointly act on their created
world." (ibid.). A speech community that has created a concep-
tual world in which there is no gravity may find it hard to
survive in a mountainous environment. The meaning theory of
knowledge and science held by social constructivists makes the
fact that theories are applicable to reality incomprehensible.
Where lies the meaning of it all?
Now, you may ask, why do I spend so much time criticizing the
philosophical ideas behind a historical analysis that I find
so much to praise in? If Weintraub or anyone else is inspired
by social constructivism and produces such excellent history,
isn't that justification enough? And is realism, the philosop-
hy often believed to underly rational reconstructions, without
problems? Can't we leave philosophical comparisons aside, and
see what is left to decide between the two historiographical
approaches that Weintraub contrasts? Well, yes, to a certain
extent. Of course, each approach imposes its own constraints,
and the fit will never be perfect. Push here and a bulge
emerges on the other side. One of the bulges that Weintraub's
constructivist history fails to contain is that economists
hardly ever speak in terms of interpretations or the reaching
consensus on the meaning of concepts. Instead, they use terms
such as "meaningful theorem", "explanation", "prediction", and
"description". On the other hand, a naïve-realist rational
reconstruction does not know what to do (or even fails to
notice) the many examples of the non-neutrality of mathematics
in economics. There is an element of sound competition to this
"battle of the bulges": by their fruits they shall be judged.
Well, certainly, as long as this is not interpreted as the
ends justifying the means. That sort of methodological instru-
mentalism, I find, is going too far. A methodology can never
be justified with an appeal to its results only. For instance,
it may be said that if there is nothing else to decide between
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      Cp. Zahar 1980.14
      Fortunately, a growing (yet still small) company of15
students of the history and methodology of economics starts
buying tickets for Tinbergen's night train to see what is
happening on board. Mirowski's More heat than light is proba-
bly the best-known recent example. In the last few years
methodologists in The Netherlands have addressed the same
subject. Cp. Boumans 1993, Van Zijp & Visser 1993, and Birner
1993 and forthcoming.
      Cp. Wigner 1960 and Popper 1963a.16
the hermeneutic and the rationality approaches, it makes sense
to choose that approach which most closely follows and takes
seriously the arguments of scientists themselves. Economists
talk about truth and description, and not about meaning or
meaning changes or the stabilization of meaning. This would
count against social constructivism. But then on the other
hand, economists also have their mouths full of words like
"empirical testing". There is no way around it: at the metho-
dological level choices have to be made. Methodology is no
mere mirror of scientific reality.
Weintraub uses his case studies as a defence of social con-
structivism, and that does not go through. I have already
argued that what Weintraub does is much more like rational
reconstructivism than he wants to make us believe. Now someone
might argue that without a social-constructivist framework we
would have remained deprived of the many valuable things
Weintraub's history brings us. I find the examples of the non-
neutrality of mathematics among the most important things of
the book. But even if Weintraub's analysis of his case studies
is an instance of social constructivism, social constructivism
is not necessary for discovering it. Weintraub's analysis of
the interaction between mathematics and economics has a coun-
terpart in the analysis of physics by a philosopher who em-
ploys a different framework, Elie Zahar.  Zahar is one of the14
few philosophers of science who sees an interesting problem
here.  He comes to the same conclusion as Weintraub: mathema-15
tics and science are so closely related that one can no longer
speak of separate tools and problems. The difference is that
Zahar says he is studying the logic of discovery. Terminology
apart, I do not think this is a fundamental difference. Zahar,
who stands in the tradition of Popper, Meyerson and Kant,
readily admits the constructive element in scientific knowled-
ge. But he also shows how mathematics has an autonomous influ-
ence on the direction in which scientific theories develop.
That stepping outside a social-constructivist framework does
not make the problem of the relation between mathematics and
science disappear is also illustrated by the articles Wigner
and Popper devoted to it.16
I even doubt whether Weintraub's analysis is an instance of
social constructivism. His reconstruction of the history of
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      Birner 1993a: 13217
      The matter of unintended consequences seems to lie at18
the controversy over ad-hocness and novel facts. Unintended
consequences also have a large role to play in debates about
scientific realism. But there is no room here to elaborate
these remarks.
stability theory relies on elements that transcend constructi-
on. The fact that each particular piece of mathematics that is
applied carries with it particular constraints is precisely
what causes the original economic problems to be transformed.
This phenomenon of problem drift (as I have called it elsewhe-
re ) shows that scientific knowledge is not purely a matter of17
construction. The application of tools has unintended conse-
quences which are only gradually discovered.   Unintended18
consequences are part of the human condition. In science, as
in life, "[m]an is not and never will be the master of his
fate" (Hayek 1979: 176; emphasis deleted). This is precisely
the reason why it is important to keep one's options open, to
have alternative views to the accepted ones. But offering
alternatives is not all there is to acquiring knowledge.
Knowledge is more than a matter of conversation, edification
and Sprachethik. Man has to live in and come to terms with a
world that is not his own creation. This involves the struggle
to survive, and survival is more than a gratuitous or free act
of construction. That is why criticism is so important in
science. Social-constructivist accounts of knowledge lack this
evolutionary aspect. This is in part because the constructi-
vist criticism of realism is aimed at the wrong target. It
identifies the realist theory of knowledge with the idea that
knowledge is a mirror of reality. But as Munz has so well
argued (in Munz 1985), since Kant realists are interested in
what goes on behind the mirror. The human cognitive apparatus
is part of the evolutionary process of survival.
Even if we grant that science is a matter of the social con-
struction of meaning, there is still a problem left for social
constructivism. It concerns the notion of a language communi-
ty. What words mean is constructed by the members of a parti-
cular community. How is membership of a community defined?
The larger community, to be a community, requires
its members to talk coherently about the economy.
Coherence was obtained by sharing a vision of the
economy ... This required a transformation of expe-
rience and an ordering of that experience; that
ordering gave substance to the new rules of the
language game called modelling the competitive eco-
nomy. (146)
But if the visions one has are the product of a community, and
membership of that community is defined by the visions one
shares, then this is circular and one cannot explain why
Samuelson or anyone else defined equilibrium as he did by
22
      Cp. Munz 1985: 193-6.19
pointing out that he was part of a particular speech communi-
ty.19
Conclusion
Weintraub's latest book sets a very high standard for the
historiography of economics. It is one of the most thorough
studies of the interaction between mathematics and economics
that exists. It shows to what extent what is now considered to
be the substance of an important sub-discipline in economics
(and hence of economics as a whole) is the result of complex
and contingent developments in the past. However, the meta-
historical conclusions Weintraub draws from his historical
analysis are not tenable, nor is the philosophical framework
he says supports his historiography. I have argued that the
author does not practice what he preaches. Of course, from a
historical point of view it is much more important that he
practices what he practices. But Weintraub's history is not a
justification of social constructivism, nor does it vindicate
meaning philosophy over realism. In fact, in his methodolo-
gical pilgrimage Weintraub has not strayed very far from his
Popperian and Lakatosian starting point. But the journey has
not been in vain. Its result is that the past is not what it
used to be. It has improved with age.
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